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 Abstract.  Over a fourteen-year period that began in 
1990 and ended with the termination of the ACF and 
ACT Basin Compacts, the State of Georgia endeavored 
to develop with Alabama and Florida agreements that 
would guarantee the downstream States a fair and 
reasonable supply of water while safeguarding, to the 
maximum extent possible, Georgia’s flexibility to 
manage its waters for the benefit of all Georgians.  From 
the perspective of Georgia’s negotiators, Georgia offered 
meaningful state-line stream flow guarantees and 
limitations on Georgia’s water use.  Ultimately, the three 
States could not reach agreement. Nevertheless, the 
years of interstate and federal-state study, cooperation, 
and negotiation greatly advanced the level of knowledge 
regarding the water resources of the ACF and ACT 
Basins and could help provide the foundation for a future 
resolution of the disputes.
INTRODUCTION
 Interstate compacts are contracts among states.  
According to the Council of State Governments, there are 
more than 200 interstate compacts currently in effect 
nationwide,1 over forty of which relate in some way to 
water allocation or water resources management.2
Interstate water compacts are one of three ways that 
water can be allocated among states, the other two being 
direct congressional apportionment (which has occurred 
only twice3), and equitable apportionment by the 
  
1 Mountjoy, John J., “National Center for Interstate 
Compacts: A New Initiative,” Spectrum: The Journal of 
State Government, Fall 2004.  Available at website for
National Center for Interstate Compacts, The Council of 
State Governments, www.csg.org.
2 Database of Interstate Compacts, National Center for 
Interstate Compacts, The Council on State Governments.
3 The Lower Colorado River and Truckee-Carson-Pyramid 
Lake were apportioned by Acts of Congress.
Supreme Court of the United States. Compacts 
commonly are viewed as the preferred alternative
because they allow states, which often are most 
knowledgeable about their own water resources and 
needs for water, to do the apportioning, and they can 
result in better relations between the states.  That being 
said, experience has shown that many interstate compacts 
ultimately end up the subject of litigation. 
 Georgia shares the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint 
(ACF) River Basin with Alabama and Florida, and the 
Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa (ACT) River Basin with 
Alabama.  Approximately 74% of the drainage area of 
the ACF Basin and 23% of the ACT Basin are in 
Georgia.4 Georgians are highly dependent upon these 
Basins in a variety of ways.  The Chattahoochee River, 
including Lake Lanier, is the primary source of water 
supply for the metropolitan north Georgia region5 as well 
as for many Georgians downstream.  Lake Allatoona and 
the rivers and streams of the ACT Basin are another 
major source of water supply to metropolitan Atlanta as 
well as the City of Rome and other communities in 
Georgia. The ACF Basin in Georgia is a rich agricultural 
region, and Georgia’s farmers rely upon its surface and 
ground waters for irrigation. The waters of the ACF and 
ACT Basins support a rich diversity of fish and wildlife 
species.6  The federal reservoirs in the ACF and ACT 
Basins are among the nation’s most visited for 
  
4 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, et al., Draft Environmental 
Impact Statement for the Water Allocation Formula for the 
ACF River Basin (ACF EIS) (September 1998), at 4-10; 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, et al., Draft Environmental 
Impact Statement for the Water Allocation Formula for the 
ACT River Basin (ACT EIS) (September 1998), at 4-11.
5 Metropolitan North Georgia Water Planning District, 
Water Supply and Water Conservation Management Plan, 
September 2003, at 3-1.
6 ACF EIS at ES-12; ACT EIS at ES-12.
recreation7, and Lake Lanier alone has been estimated to 
contribute well in excess of a billion dollars in revenue 
attributable to recreation.8  Federal dams and reservoirs 
in the ACF and ACT Basins also produce hydropower 
and provide limited support for commercial navigation.
 In 1997, Alabama, Georgia, and Florida enacted laws 
establishing the ACF and ACT Basin Compacts.  
Congress subsequently passed the Compacts as federal 
legislation, and President Clinton signed them into law.9  
The Compacts arose after several years of cooperation 
among the States and federal government on the 
ACT/ACF Comprehensive Study. The Compacts, which 
are identical to one another, established the legal 
authority and process for the Governors (of Alabama and 
Georgia in the case of the ACT, and of all three States for 
the ACF) to develop formulas for allocating the waters of 
the ACF and ACT Basins among the States.  
KEY FEATURES OF THE ACF AND ACT 
COMPACTS
 The Compacts created the ACF and ACT Basin 
Commissions, which consisted of the Governors (as 
voting members) and a Federal Commissioner (non-
  
7 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Mobile District, 
http://water.sam.usace.army.mil/recreat.htm.
8 McCrary, Joseph L., Kundell, James E., Thompson, 
Steffney, and Miller, Alice E., Management Options for 
Lake Lanier, Diagnostic/Feasibility Study of Lake Sidney 
Lanier, Chapter 7, Carl Vinson Institute of Government, 
University of Georgia, (1998).  The authors acknowledge 
that other reported estimates of the economic impact of 
recreation at Lake Lanier far exceed $1 billion.
9 ACF Compact:  Alabama Acts 1997, No. 97-67, § 1, Ala. 
Code § 33-19-1, signed by the Governor of Alabama on 
February 25, 1997; 1997 Fla.  Laws ch.  97-25, § 1, Fla.  
Stat. § 373.71, signed by the Governor of Florida on 
February 25, 1997; Ga. L. 1997, p.  29, § 1, O.C.G.A. § 12-
10-100, signed by the Governor of Georgia on February 25, 
1997; and Public Law No. 105-104, 111 Stat. 2219, signed 
by the President of the United States on November 20, 
1997; ACT Compact: Alabama Acts 1997, No. 97-66, § 1, 
Ala. Code § 33-18-1,  signed by the Governor of Alabama 
on February 25, 1997; Ga. L. 1997, p. 15, § 1, O.C.G.A. § 
12-10-110, signed by the Governor of Georgia on February 
25, 1997; and Public Law No. 105-105, 111 Stat. 2223, 
passed by the United States Congress on November 7, 1997, 
and signed by the President of the United States on 
November 20, 1997.
voting) for each Commission.10 The Federal 
Commissioner represented the federal agencies having an
interest in the water resources of the two Basins.  Each
Compact authorized the Commission to develop a 
formula for equitably apportioning the waters of the 
Basin “while protecting the water quality, ecology, and 
biodiversity of the Basin as provided in the Clean Water 
Act, ESA,  . . . and other applicable federal laws.”11
While this did not establish an affirmative obligation to 
protect water quality and biodiversity apart from existing 
federal laws,12 it clarified that the Compacts gave the 
States no authority to violate those laws.  The Compacts 
continued the “live and let live” policy that the States had 
adopted in prior Memoranda of Agreement, which 
provided that the States would not oppose reasonable 
increases in water use within the other States during the 
pendency of the Compacts.13
 While the Compacts did not prohibit all confidential 
(non-public) discussions among the States, they required 
the Commission to hold its formal meetings in public.14  
Each Compact established an initial deadline of 
December 31, 1998 for the States to reach agreement on
an allocation formula but allowed the States to extend 
that deadline.15 If the States did not reach agreement by 
an ultimate deadline, the Compact would terminate 
automatically. The ACF Compact so terminated as of 
September 1, 2003, and the ACT Compact terminated as 
of August 1, 2004.
 Each Compact instructed that if an allocation formula 
were adopted and approved, the federal agencies were to 
exercise their power, authority, and discretion in a 
manner consistent with the allocation formula so long as 
doing so did not conflict with federal law.16  This was a 
significant provision given the important role that the 
United States Army Corps of Engineers and other federal 
agencies would play in helping implement a formula
agreement.  The Compacts established a process by 
  
10 ACF and ACT Compacts at Article VI.
11 Article VII.
12 The authors acknowledge that some observers of the 
Compact negotiations interpret the Compacts to impose 





which the Governors, after providing an opportunity for 
notice and comment, could adopt a formula by 
unanimous agreement, after which the Federal 
Commissioner would review the agreement to determine 
whether it complied with federal law.  The Federal 
Commissioner could either issue a letter of concurrence, 
upon the issuance of which the formula agreement would 
become effective; issue a letter of nonconcurrence, which 
would invalidate the agreement; or issue nothing, in 
which case the agreement would become effective.17  
 That the Compacts did not contain allocation formulas 
but instead authorized the States to develop them made 
the Compacts somewhat unique.  With very few 
exceptions (the Red River Compact being another), 
interstate water compacts include the apportionment or 
formula for apportionment.  Thus, the States in this 
instance held a rare and valuable opportunity to develop
formulas that, unless vetoed by the Federal 
Commissioner, would command compliance by the 
federal agencies to the extent allowed by law.  At the 
same time, this presented extraordinary challenges to 
negotiate in the public eye comprehensive and complex 
agreements for protecting each State’s needs for many 
years into the future. 
FORMULA PROPOSALS AND ULTIMATE 
OBSTACLES TO AGREEMENT
 The three States devoted extraordinary resources to the 
more than seven years of Compact negotiations.  Over 
the course of the negotiations, the States developed a 
general framework for agreement for each Basin that 
focused primarily on operation of the federal reservoirs 
to meet reasonable water needs while supplying, at a 
minimum, specified stream flows at the state lines.  The 
States also developed general rules for ongoing 
governance by the Commissions, as well as flow and 
water quality monitoring, and information sharing among 
the States and federal government.   
 A few of the more significant matters upon which the 
States ultimately were unable to agree during the 
Compact negotiations were the following:  
 Flows in Excess of Minimum Flow Requirements.  
After the States negotiated the numeric flows that, at a 
minimum, were to be maintained, Florida and Alabama 
sought substantial commitments to guarantee that these 
numeric flows would be exceeded.  While Georgia was 
willing to acknowledge that certain of the minimum 
flows as a matter of fact naturally would be exceeded 
much if not all of the time and eventually agreed to 
certain limits on its water use, the particular assurances 
  
17 Article VII(a).
that Florida and Alabama demanded created too great a 
risk for Georgia that the United States Army Corps of 
Engineers could be pressured to operate the federal 
reservoirs to significantly exceed the minimum flows at 
the expense of maintaining acceptable reservoir levels 
upstream.
 Reservoir Operations.  In a related issue, the States 
did not have a meeting of the minds on the rules pursuant 
to which the Corps of Engineers would operate the 
federal reservoirs, including desired reservoir elevations 
and the amount of mandated or desired hydropower 
production.   
 Consumption Caps.  Early in the negotiations, Florida 
and Alabama each expressed a preference for state-line 
flow guarantees over consumption caps within Georgia.  
From Georgia’s perspective, the flow commitments were 
negotiated under the assumption that, if Georgia satisfied 
specified flow commitments, Georgia would retain the 
flexibility to manage its own water use. Eventually,
Georgia nevertheless agreed to certain standards and 
requirements governing water use within Georgia, such 
as interbasin transfer limits and standards for new 
withdrawals and non-federal reservoirs, and was willing 
to continue to abide by the already-stringent standards
governing water use under Georgia law. Florida and 
Alabama ultimately demanded numeric caps on 
Georgia’s consumption on top of all of the other 
commitments, however, and Georgia considered this 
demand to be unreasonable and unduly risky given the 
other commitments that Georgia already was making.
 Effect of Unanticipated Conditions.  All three States 
initially agreed that if, due to a record drought, a change
in federal law, discovery of an erroneous assumption 
underlying the formula, or some other unexpected event, 
complying with the agreement became significantly more 
harmful to any State than had been anticipated, the 
formula would be suspended while the States determined 
how to respond to the event. Florida and Alabama 
changed their minds, however, and opposed the 
suspension provision.  The States could not agree on any 
other approach for responding to such events.
CONCLUSIONS
 From Georgia’s perspective, the fourteen years during 
which it, with its downstream neighbor States, studied 
and negotiated over allocation formula agreements for 
the ACF and ACT Basins must be viewed as an era of 
both accomplishment and missed opportunity.  The 
Comprehensive Study and the Compacts offered the 
opportunity for prolonged and intense interstate and 
federal-state cooperation. The ACT/ACF Comprehensive 
Study has advanced the body of knowledge regarding the 
water resources of the two basins. The Compact 
negotiations  identified and narrowed areas of dispute.  
Though the Compacts have terminated, the achievements 
and experiences of this period will inform state and 
federal policymakers and likely will contribute in some 
way to future resolution of the complex issues regarding 
the sharing of the waters of the ACF and ACT Basins 
among Georgia, Alabama, and Florida.  
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